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A Tale of Three Worlds or More: Young People, Media and Class in India 
Shakuntala Banaji, LSE 
 
Introduction 
A burgeoning literature on young people and media consumption in the west has not 
been matched by similar studies about young people India or its South Asian neighbours. 
Published studies on this topic, which will be explored in the opening sections of this chapter, 
tend to concentrate on urban middle-class Generation Y youth or on the educational 
importance of technology for rural populations. Issues such as pleasure and participation 
through media consumption are only mentioned in passing. Yet the rapid neo-liberalisation of 
broadcast media and film in India as well as the erstwhile expansion of its middle classes 
since the 1990s has given rise to a variety of myths about  ‘Indian’ youth. Their consumption 
habits, educational prowess and aptitude for information technology have been discussed in 
articles on the new 'call centre' crews and dance studios. But questions about the other India 
or Indias remain unanswered —how are working class young people changing their habits in 
relation to media, work and consumption? Are young rural migrants to cities and youth in 
rural areas of India doing the same things and aspiring to the same sorts of lives as their urban 
counterparts? And how are these aspirations bound up with the media representations which 
are so ubiquitous in cities? Via snapshots from a decade of interview-based qualitative 
research, and contemporary literature on the diverse contexts inhabited by children, young 
people and their parents in India today, the discussion in this chapter will contextualise the 
complex lives and experiences of different groups and classes of young people in South 
Asia's most populous nation. To begin with, it is worth asking how this chapter sits with the 
volume as a whole and why its title contains no reference to Generation X. 
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When I first considered the topic of Generation X in India seriously at the editor’s 
request, I was assailed by doubts about the meaningfulness of a study that worked from the 
barest stereotype in an attempt to delineate any aspect of social life in a contemporary nation 
of the global south. India’s presence in a variety of online literatures from those on 
development or politics to those on trade and the economy
1
 is shadowed by clichés—the 
‘fastest growing market’ with ‘a middle class of fifty million’, the ‘second-largest’ economy 
in the developing world, the ‘biggest democracy’, ‘friend’ of the US and Europe in the fight 
against global terror etcetera, etcetera. Similarly the presence of youth in academic and policy 
literatures the world over has been tainted by journalistic pronouncements about declining 
participation levels, civic disengagement, individualism, risk culture, remix culture, hybrid 
identities and a postmodern, global cultural sensibility. Academic articles on Indian cultural 
production and circulation often open with implicitly homogenizing assertions: “The times 
they are a-changing! For India, these are historic times. Her long-established and often 
fiercely guarded traditions are undergoing rapid and sweeping transformations as she flexes 
her muscles to compete in a global economy”2. In my research on both media cultures in 
India and youth cultures across South Asia and the UK over the past decade
3
 these clichés 
have proved more a burden than a guide. They have clearly worked in the interests of some 
and against the interests of others. So, whose interests have they served? 
 Numerous academic papers, projects and studies have been funded and spawned by 
the notion of a risk society and youth civic disengagement and voting decline
4
 . Talk of 
generational breaks and intergenerational rifts, McDonaldized youth culture as well as of 
patterns of youth consumption can clearly serve the interest of marketers who play on notions 
of ‘cool’ and ‘hip’ regardless of the context. Counter-arguments—suggesting continuities 
between generations and heterogeneity within generations, cross-cut as they are by class, 
ethnicity, ability, religion, age, nationality, gender and sexuality—are briefly heard and then 
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strenuously ignored. At times it even seems that both academics and marketers are colluding 
to create the absurdly impossible phenomenon of which they speak: distinct generations with 
distinct characteristics, the world over. And this, unfortunately, means that real distinctions 
drawn in India by people campaigning on or researching issues of labour, class, gender or 
religious discrimination
5
  between the everyday experiences of the powerful few and the 
exploited many, are being ignored in favour of clichés. With regard to India, for instance, it is 
not uncommon to hear that ‘everyone is now connected’ so ‘let’s move it online’. What these 
businesses mean is that ‘everyone who matters in terms of service capital’ is now connected: 
the upper-middle-classes, to be precise. 
 
First Class, Seven Star India 
Among the upper middle class in India are those who can afford international air 
travel on a monthly basis, exclusive holidays or go to university in a foreign country; those 
who have guaranteed housing, running water, multiple servants, private healthcare, laptops, 
connectivity, cars and the latest mobile phones
6
. This group includes those who buy branded 
clothing both Western and indigenous, who have never been without food or shelter for a 
day, who participate via various networks in both Indian and global cultural activities from 
fashion, dance and drama to film, books and music
7
. Most importantly, many people in this 
group have connections to political power, to the police and to law enforcement; they can 
obtain visas and reservations which are denied to others; many, but not all, avoid paying their 
taxes by hiring the most expensive accountants; on some occasions they can even get out of 
jail or avoid prosecution for crimes which carry severe sentences; they can fund or withdraw 
their support from political campaigns; they can and do go into politics. And this group of 
people—what else can one call it but an indigenous elite?—are not a fiction, although, like 
the employer in Indian novelist’s Arvind Adiga’s White Tiger (2008) they are 
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disproportionately represented even in fiction. Indeed, they and their disposable wealth held 
either in India or overseas have grown exponentially over the past two decades, contributing 
to everything from global warming via the use of multiple cars
8
 to rightwing religious 
nationalism and a potential nuclear war with Pakistan. It is worth dwelling for a spell on this 
group, and on studies of their media habits, their consumption patterns. They are the smallest 
minority in terms of India’s class system (barely 1% of the population are upper-
middleclass), but they are the most internationally visible, the group by which much that is 
defined as ‘Indian’ is measured and often celebrated9. And, ironically doing even the cliché 
injustice, it is this group who are also often elided with Generation X. While UK-based 
Bollywood scholar Rachel Dwyer (2000), distinguishes between the public cultural 
consumption patterns and historical transition of India’s ‘modern metropolitan bourgeois’ in 
terms of old and ‘new middle classes’, ‘lower middle classes’ the ‘upper classes’ and the 
‘noveau riche’10 , sociologist Arun Saldanha’s ethnography of music consumption in 
Bangalore is situated amongst the uppermost layer of the nouveau riche (who make up a 
miniscule 0.01% of the population in India). He discusses the interconnectedness of wealth, 
spending power, symbolic capital and political power amongst this group, suggesting that 
their ‘subcultural capital’ extends far beyond the obvious power of being chauffeured around 
in expensive cars in the middle of the day or ‘midday-parties’ held while others are at work 
and school (p. 341) to the symbolic status conferred by listening to western pop music, 
hanging out and flirting openly in a society which frowns on and sanctions intimacy between 
unmarried youth of different genders.  
 Cultural anthropologist Ritty Lukose, who has worked for many years on gender, 
class, youth and consumption in the South Indian state of Kerala (2005), argues that specific 
gender norms relating to caste or religion continue to structure some of the experiences of 
children and women even in the most upper class homes. Lukose rejects some essential 
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commonality of experience between poor women in India and their elite counterparts but 
acknowledges gendered experiences amongst upper-middleclass youth. She intentionally 
nuances the almost monolithic picture of privilege drawn in the opening paragraphs of this 
chapter. She suggests that, “by paying attention to this terrain (of cultural consumption), it 
becomes possible to examine the contradictions of consumption for young women and men 
who are both objects of commoditization and subjects of consumption”11. Processes of 
globalisation and cultural consumption in India’s neoliberal economy thus have implications 
both in terms of class and of gender. The beauty industry, with its conspicuous emphasis on 
the female body and sexuality, is a case in point. This emphasis has become more evident via 
hotly contested
12
 beauty contests, and popularised by the crowning of Indian contestants, 
such as actress Lara Dutta, as Miss Universe.
13
 
However, as Lukose proceeds to explore, some of these pageants became the grounds 
for ferocious debates and violent clashes between different factions of the Indian public— 
rightwing religious nationalist groups, leftwing feminist groups, marketers, local and global 
media and the police forces of various states and towns. Problematically, the ideological 
tensions between the various groups of protestors were erased in public debate in favour of a 
monolithic moral condemnation of the pageant organisers and participants. This was despite 
the fact that for protestors allied with Hindu chauvinist rightwing politics the pageants were 
constructed as a symbol of some invasive ‘alien’ culture while for feminists it was associated 
with an ‘imperialist’ and sexist form of ‘capitalist oppression’14: (same as above). 
Picking up with overt disapproval on representations of the ‘nation’ on music 
television in the context of an interview-based study of urban MTV-viewers, US-based 
sociologist of youth and media, Vamsee Juluri makes the point that many young Indians 
assume they are participating in a global youth culture which appreciates and admires ‘India’ 
in particular, when actually what they are doing, according to Juluri, is buying into the ‘easy 
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naturalness’ of ‘poverty, individualism and greed’. He insists that ‘the nationalism of youth 
culture is problematically articulated not only with religious nationalism and intolerance but 
also in the fact that music video discourses of nationality are profoundly orientalistic’ and  
argues that young Indians who consume MTV music videos are colluding in their own 
‘exoticization’ and ‘spectacularization’15. 
Amongst the urban middle classes in particular, then, there is the merest suggestion of 
such a thing as a generational consciousness, although not as specific in terms of cultural 
consumption as in the western literature.  The pre-liberalisation generation, who grew up in a 
closed economy before 1990, with state tv and radio and school text-books that had a strong 
homogenising national/nationalist vision are quite distinct from those born in the 1990s , 
whose parents have bought them all that money can buy or try to do so, who have known 
several bouts of anti-muslim pogroms, a neo-fascist government for ten years and who feel 
both an affinity for the west and are riven by anxieties about india's traditions and 'place in 
the world'. As will be seen in coming sections, all of this has had little or no effect on rural 
and urban working class generational identities – althoug there are specific places where 
generation Y youth in the working classes are losing their traditional occupations, and hence 
joining a loose urban lumpen proletariat, sometimes ready to be mobilised by fascist 
identities (anti-democratic, anti-Muslim, anti-Christian). Meanwhile even upper middleclass 
youth from different urban/rural, religious/caste/regional identities have stronger ties to 
others within their region/caste/language group than they do to young people from other 
classes, making the case for a generational consciousness even within the upperclasses very 
weak. 
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Negotiating Hybrid Identities? The Exhausting Constraint of Being Lower Middle-
Class in India 
 Discussed exhaustively in feminist anthropologist Purnima Mankekar’s (1999) 
ethnography of television, nationalism and womanhood in a New Delhi suburb, the living 
conditions, aspirations, sexual practices, religious beliefs and political practices, consumer 
habits and media consumption of this shifting grouping in different cities and amongst 
different castes and religious groups nevertheless varies significantly around a consistent 
core: a patriarchal family structure and lack of privacy/living space. Everything else, from 
religion, the number of members in a household, a family’s annual income to political 
affiliation and educational aspirations may vary quite significantly between small towns and 
large metropolises and even between ethnic communities or groups. For instance, according 
to interviews I have carried out, at least in urban areas, lower-middle class women may work 
or be confined to their homes but either of these options generally depends on the demands or 
agreement of parents, husbands, brothers; couples may choose to form nuclear family units 
with their children, but again, living space is a constant and traumatic issue, with privacy at a 
premium; families may subscribe to a variety of prejudices such as religious nationalist 
politics or to what is now considered an ‘old-fashioned’ Nehruvian vision of integration 
between castes and religions or rarely to openly socialist politics—but they all have to deal 
on a daily basis with corrupt bureaucrats
16
, lack of school places, rising prices. The 
implications of these factors for the politics, identifications, consumption patterns and sexual 
relationships of lower-middle class youth has been explored at some length in my own 
discussions with Hindi film viewers
17
 and are meticulously discussed in work by Bombay-
based youth sociologist Leena Abraham (2001) and her colleagues with college students in 
Bombay. In public, strong gendered hierarchies persist, with girls internalising or being 
forced to spout discourses around the ‘dirtiness’ of sex and the value of female chastity, while 
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at least some boys and young men can boast of sexual exploits, and play the field. Abraham 
concludes that gender relations amongst lower middle class youth are deeply asymetrical 
when it comes to acquiring information about and/or exploring their sexuality, and 
discrimination against young women and girls is ‘all-pervasive’. Abraham attributes the 
cultivation of an agressive/assertive male sexuality and a passive, timid and shame-filled 
sexuality on the part of young women to the overall patriarchal context. Paraphrase and 
remove quote 
Media, particularly since the increased availability of satellite channels, is seen to play 
an interesting role in this apparently tightly controlled discursive field, not least in relation to 
consumer culture
18
 and Rightwing Hindu nationalist movements
19
 . Each of these sets of 
literatures is worthy of several volumes in its own right, particularly in relation to the social 
psychology of fascism and the (at least internationally) lesser known and discussed 
behaviours of millions of Indian citizens. [TEXTBOX 1] Instead, I return once more to the 
ways in which interconnections between class, public culture and gender amongst lower 
middleclass youth in India have been theorised by researchers in the field and been excluded 
from studies on Generation X; and here the term ‘hybridity’ comes to the fore as a key 
concept.  
Offering an analysis of what they term the ‘hybrid’ articulations of identity, 
nationalism, and gender in popular singer Alisha Chinai’s music video, Made In India, and 
answering their own question about the kind of resource provided for young Indian women 
by Indian pop videos and music television, Shanti Kumar and Michael Curtin argue that “[t]o 
term the hybrid articulations of Indianness engendered by the transcultural discourse of music 
television as schizophrenic may seem rather disturbing to those of us more attuned to the so-
called normal models of singular identity”20. However tempting it might be to subscribe 
wholeheartedly to an optimistic notion of schizophrenic or hybrid identity as a metaphor for 
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the creative encounters between lower middle-class youth and media in India—and it is 
tempting, especially when reading some of the more turgid effects studies which accuse the 
media of everything from child pregnancy to rape and de-culturation—poststructuralist 
commentaries sidestep problematic issues concerning the everyday discourses around, for 
instance, religion, or sex, class and the body, already circulating in viewing communities, and 
the political economy of media control. Leela Fernandes argues that “Hybridity in this 
context does not transcend but is intricately connected to processes of capital formation 
within the boundaries of the modern nation state [. . .] hybridity in India is inextricably linked 
to the class-based cosmopolitanism of the urban middle-classes” (p. 622). Her conclusion, 
interestingly, like that of Ritty Lukose, is that anxieties and fractures in reception of global-
local/western-Indian cultural hybridity is displaced onto a gendered discourse which views 
women (and the control of their sexuality) as an ultimate arbiter of cultural Indianness. 
Discussions with young film viewers in India over the past ten years suggest that this 
displacement of anxieties about ‘westernisation’ (conceived as entailing a break-down of the 
traditional Indian joint family and, potentially, a sort of individualistic materialism) onto 
young women in particular has striking psychic and material repercussions. Most notably, the 
hypocritical enforcement of norms of modesty in clothing for young women following their 
marriage is discussed openly by young men, as if it is completely natural. This entails first a 
confusing insistence that‘girlfriends’ dress to emphasise their bodies in a way similar to 
Hindi film actresses before marriage and second that once these same girls become ‘wives’ 
that they forego any pleasure to be had from fashion and cover themselves, particularly in the 
presence of men’s parents. Ironically, this attitude on the part of young lower-middleclass 
men was considered particularly ‘modern’, as ‘traditional’ people would apparently refuse to 
allow young women to dress ‘sexy’ either before or after marriage. Young women’s wishes 
and habits, their agency in relation to clothing and dress, were really not of particular concern 
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to the young men who spoke in this way, although these views were challenged, on occasion, 
by both young male and female cinema-goers
21
.  
Although discussions with lower-middle class urban viewers (born in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, and interviewed between 2000 and 2003) provide only part of the picture, 
the insights which arise are echoed in other studies since then, and remain an important 
reminder of the absurdity and dangers of homogenising discourse about the psychological 
characteristics of a supposed-Generation X in India. As I discuss in a forthcoming chapter on 
Bollywood representations of youth and class,
22
the depiction of modern consumerist 
practices on-screen, with teenage heroes and heroines drinking Pepsi, wearing brand-name 
clothing, and jetting off to foreign locations is indeed sometimes accompanied by more 
exploratory representations of gender, heterosexual sexuality and romance; these offer young 
people repositories for fantasy and imagined futures and identities which are evident in 
discussions with them and, as such, are not reducible to a single problematic representation. 
However, equally frequently, consumerist modernity in media productions is embedded in a 
context that posits so-called ‘tradition’ as counterbalancing western consumerism and 
residing in young women’s (and even young men’s) sexual virtue, chastity and their 
obedience to their parents’ endogamous demands. Nor are these discourses recognised 
explicitly only by academics. When given a chance to talk and think through issues, some 
young lower-middleclass viewers are thoughtful about the kinds of compromises materialist 
fantasies might entail, noting that there are painful choices to be made about the kind of life-
style one wants, the amount of independence one can expect, the complex pressures of living 
in consumerist surroundings. A lower-middle class 20-year old emphasised, ‘It is okay to like 
Nike-Shikey stuff... But I know friends of mine who don’t ask  “does this boy respect me?” 
they only ask “How much does his daddy earn?” Somehow in the films, like in 
Yaadein/Memories
23
, boys are rich and they let you work outside, but it doesn’t always end 
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so well.’ Another family, interviewed in 2007, detailed the tensions between parents and 
teenage children, where the tug-of-war over purchasing material goods was always 
imbricated with the symbolic struggle for independence and control over the young people’s 
lives and characters.
24
 Using interviews to access North Indian urban men’s feelings on a 
range of issues, US Anthropologist Steve Derné (p. 205) too argues, “The divergent effects of 
globalisation on class lines is most clearly seen when it comes to transformations in family 
and gender.” Some of his interpretations of interviewee testimony do rely on debatable 
descriptions of what is ‘essentially Indian’ or ‘traditionally Indian.’ However, he also 
suggests that, “middleclass identity is more and more rooted in consumption” (p. 203) 
primarily in cases where consumption is actually a possibility because of increased income 
rather than just because of more advertising. This leads him to conclude that actual 
institutional possibilities, rather than mediated ‘messages’ and imaginaries inflect male 
viewers’ behaviour with regard to gender-relations, and returns us to a more materialist arena 
where ‘economic structures’ trump ‘new cultural possibilities.’ Derné’s simple proposition, 
made in relation to mediated meaning, identity and the lower middle-classes, is a good 
starting point for our final section on the Generation X concept, working-class youth and 
media in India. 
 
Third Class and Below: Working Class Lives and Media Globalisation in India. 
 
Researchers and journalists as well as other cultural commentators and ‘the public’ at 
large in so-called developed nations certainly know intellectually that there are many  poor 
people in India. The poor do exist, one way or another, as a metaphor (for the wretched of the 
earth) or as a reality (slum tourism is more and more popular)
25
. One has only to look at the 
statistics -  as mentioned, India’s middle class, including both upper and lower echelons, is 
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estimated at around 200 million, barely 20% of the population - or to watch Slumdog 
Millionaire.  There have been dozens of more or less detailed and participatory studies of 
working class lives, work, labour-relation, caste, politics, violence and gender in India over 
the past two decades which testify not only to the existence of 80% of India’s population but 
also to the massive diversity in their experiences. As we will see, even selective engagement 
with these disrupts powerful academic narratives about Generation X in India. 
Writing in 2009, before an election, that little is set to change for the majority in India despite 
over ‘150,000 suicides by farmers’ in recent years,  veteran Indian journalist and social 
activist Praful Bidwai notes ‘the affluent in India pay among the world's lowest tax rates, 
usually under 20%. Nor is there inheritance tax in this super-hierarchical society where 
privilege at birth guarantees lifelong status’.26 Other commentators can and do take issue with 
a perspective that is based simply on analyses in terms of social class—and lessens the 
importance, for instance, of voting to keep out of office a government which uses popular 
racist rhetoric against minority communities and indulges in ethnic cleansing and  pogroms to 
boost their electoral might
27
. However, the facts remain. The priorities and often desperate 
needs of families, youth and children in the majority of India’s population are so different 
from those of the middle-classes and upper classes that the exclusion of 80% of India’s 
population from much cultural studies literature (such as that on Generation X) is both 
predictable and extremely damaging.  
So, in what ways should neoliberal policies (of which the so-called ‘liberalisation’ 
and ‘globalisation’ of the media and cultural environment are but strands) be seen to be 
accelerating changes in the lives of poor, working-class and/or destitute Indians in both urban 
and rural areas? Varman and Belk, in what is a somewhat simplistic but nonetheless 
instructive study of the media effects of consumer advertising on working-class lives believe 
that economic  liberalization in India has entailed easy access to cheap labour for 
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multinational corporations and at the sametime the removal via structural adjustment plans of 
any safe-guards, state control and employment generation which the poor and destitute had 
relied on in previous decades. Indeed, ‘The reduction in state expenditures in India has 
resulted in an overall decline in per capita consumption in the critical domains of food’ (p. 
233). This, they insist, has entailed an increase in the horrifying gap between the 
middleclasses and the vast numbers of poor people across India. So, while it is not as crude as 
‘Here, have 24/7 TV, but don’t worry, we’re enabling it by removing price subsidies for 
hundreds of millions of people who live on less than 500 calories a day’ it is also not absurd 
to conceptualise the ‘great changes’ happening in India in that manner. 
 Pal, Lakshmanan and Toyama, (2009) meanwhile, discuss the relationship between 
poverty and perceptions of computers in Education in four rural districts in Karnataka, South 
India, noting that most rural parents who work on estates would send their children to a 
school regardless of whether the school had computers as long as there was a midday meal; 
however the withdrawal of a food-to-study incentive would mean that they would remove 
their children from school. However, there were also unforeseen benefits noted by some of 
the parents in this study to the introduction of collective computer resources in the school—
notably the necessity in terms of social pedagogy for children from different social classes 
and castes to sit beside each other ‘on the same bench’ (p. 143) while using the computers—
where slates or notebooks would not have necessitated such an intimate collective endeavour. 
Based on ethnographic fieldwork among the youth of a marginalized leather worker 
community in urban West Bengal, Ruchira Ganguly-Scrase
28
 gives an account of levels of 
tension around economic and cultural change and their distinct repercussions for women, 
men and the community as a whole. She describes how changes in the leather industry and in 
workingclass male perceptions of this occupation have left painful gaps in household incomes 
and in the identities of young Rabi Das men which are, depressingly, being filled by the 
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multiplepressures on Rabi Das girls and women to quit education, take up menial domestic 
jobs and remain as secluded as possible to ensure a family’s ‘honour’.  
 
In a similar vein, Qayum and Ray’s work (2003) on modern middleclass employer’s 
changing relationships to domestic servitude should make shocking reading, but it is an 
everyday reality across most of South Asia, either on one side of the class divide or the other. 
Their argument is, broadly, that the master-class have been used to controlling every aspect 
of their servants’ lives, including having them living with their homes and have, in return, 
taken on a feudal role towards their servants; however, the move to middle-class nuclear 
families and flats as well as a sort of democratisation in expectations means that feudal bonds 
are floundering, particularly in big cities but that the need of the middleclass for servants has 
not diminished. In one tiny telling instance, a working-class woman complains that, despite 
supposed changes, even intimate aspects of her everyday life are controlled by her bosses. As 
Qayum and Ray recount in one particularly poignant case, young domestic servant Zeenat’s 
employer refused to allow her to bathe in the morning, as was her custom, humiliated her 
continually and accused her of using ‘more soap than the entire family (p. 542).  
Such accounts by working class women given post-globalisation and post neoliberal 
reform are consistent with those given in the extended interview-based study My Life if One 
Long Struggle in 1984 by labour historians  Rohini Hensman, Sujata Gothoskar and 
researcher Neelam Chaturvedi . Sitting, standing, sleeping, which vessels to eat or drink 
from, whether one is allowed to watch television or listen to the radio while doing chores, 
whether one can raise one’s gaze when speaking and when one might visit one’s children are 
all tightly controlled by the middle-classes, particularly for domestic servants. Given that a 
phenomenally large number of domestic servants in India are children between the ages of 8 
and 16, the power-differentials and psychic impacts are even more traumatic. While it has 
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been suggested that paid domestic servitude for working-class boys and girls provides some 
measure of protection from the harsh conditions of slum sweat-shops, brothels, restaurants, 
rag-picking, plantation work or other factory and manual occupations, it is also the case that 
being confined indoors with middle and upper middleclass families can be equally dangerous, 
particularly where working-class life is held cheap. The number of reported and unreported 
sexual assaults, sexual harassment and rapes of domestic servants in India, as well as deaths 
from beating or accident is not known. But extended discussions with young people, 
including slum-dweller children and female domestic servants over the last decade suggest 
that reported cases form only the tip of a horrifying iceberg.  
 
Generation X – What Generation X? 
 
When researching responses to the film Slumdog Millionaire in Bombay in 2009, I 
was told a variety of disturbing stories in and around discussions of the film’s depiction of 
slum-dwellers and street children. One 19-year old, Sushil, recounted how he came at the age 
of 11 to Bombay from his tiny, destitute village in Uttar Pradesh and worked first as a tea boy 
and then as a domestic servant. He was constantly criticised and then beaten brutally for 
apparent inattention to his chores, and for ‘looking at’ his employers. When Sushil talks 
about there being ‘nothing to do’ and ‘nothing’ in his village, he does not mean that there are 
no shopping malls or discos. He means that there is no work—and no food. Nor does his 
concern with being employed mean that he is not interested in cultural life. We had a long 
and emotional discussion about his use of the mobile phone and his delight in a variety of 
films. But none of the potential cultural attractions in Bombay counterbalance the 
exploitation and violence he has experienced. If there were a decent livelihood to be had back 
in his home state, that is where he would be. Asmita, who has a three year old daughter and 
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moves from building-site to building-site with her construction-worker husband, described 
the only time in her life when she had the opportunity to watch television, when she was 
pregnant and working as a maid. As the primary care-giver to her employers’ three children, 
she would feed them and watch television programmes chosen by them at the same time. She 
was dismissed when her own baby was born, however,  despite her entreaties, and 
remembered the job as being one of her better places of employment because she was neither 
assaulted nor humiliated there, and had access to media.  
Najma, quoted in a recent paper on Slumdog Millionaire
29
, was full of regret at the 
absence of her children from her everyday life. Living in a shantytown and working six 
domestic jobs, she bitterly misses her eight year old son and two year old daughter, who have 
remained in the village with her mother. She said she occasionally got to watch part of a film 
while cleaning in someone’s house, and had thus viewed slumdog millionaire in segments, at 
odd times. Her comment that during the film Slumdog Millionaire ‘everyone was just waiting 
for the poor boy to become rich… most of us are not so fortunate’ sums up her sense of the 
film’s core weakness. However, unlike some of the other viewers in this category, she 
reflects on the fact that Hindi films rarely show the life of the ‘common people’, finding in 
the film some merit as well as some emotional resonance. Her comment ‘it was in his stars so 
he won’ sounded straightforward—almost as if she believed in fate —but it could have been 
ironic or even slightly accusing: a director who does not believe in fate using fate as a 
gimmick to reinforce for most poor viewers the uselessness of trying to change anything in 
their lives. Ultimately, Slumdog Millionaire, though it used their labour and their stories, like 
so many trendy global media products, was not really aimed at working-class viewers in the 
country and city it depicts. Meanwhile, across villages and small towns, some young people 
and children are experimenting with television by viewing collectively or going to far-flung 
houses which have cable connections to relax, learn three or four languages or get a better 
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understanding of what it means to ‘have sex’; while others have intermittent electricity, no 
running water or time to do this, for after their two-hour trek to and from school, their 
household chores and work with animals they, like their parents, are simply too exhausted to 
look further afield for entertainment.  
It is infuriating, rather than ironic, given these circumstances, that many middle and 
upper-middle class respondents speak casually in interviews of the working-classes as lazy 
and stupid, aggressive, prone to addiction, sexist, vulnerable to the ill-effects of media and 
generally waiting to participate in urban violence and communal rioting. Evidence from a 
range of studies
30
, of course, suggests not that poor people in India are saintly or happy, but 
that they suffer —differentially, based on location, caste and gender of coursefrom many of 
the same prejudices and processes affecting other social groups; and anti-minority violence is 
included in this list. Like socialist or socially conscious members of the upper and lower 
middle-classes, however, the rural poor and urban working-class also organize themselves
31
 
into collective formations, social movements, trade unions, co-operatives, media collectives. 
They participate, often at great risk to themselves individually, in attempts to change the 
vicious and unjust social frameworks ignored or reinforced by the very global capitalist 
system which gives Indian elites iMacs and the lower-middle-classes V-TV style hybridity 
and 24/7 news.  
Space dictates that I draw this whirlwind discussion to a close. Leisure and cultural 
consumption are not luxuries, and I do not mean to make out that they are. Like food, water, 
clothing, shelter and education, they are, in many ways, necessities of life. But in countries 
like India, however fast things may seem to be changing for highly visible parts of the 
population, however resilient formal economic growth has proven, however much multiple 
identities or intersectional identifications might be in evidence during interviews, however 
cosmopolitan an elite seems to be with its social networks and American slang, things are not 
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changing in the same ways and at the same pace across different groups in the population. In 
fact, some things are hardly changing at all. Despite several decades of subaltern studies and 
subaltern history, despite engagement with the critiques of postcolonial theorists, it is still not 
unusual to find a tiny distorted part of India taken for the complex whole. However, if you 
still think that you can spot a ‘Generation X’ in India —who am I to stop you?  
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